2015 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

6-25-2015

USA v. Russell Franklin

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015

Recommended Citation
"USA v. Russell Franklin" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 663.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/663

This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 13-3169
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RUSSELL FRANKLIN,
Appellant
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(No. 2-11-cr-00131-001)
District Judge: Hon. Arthur J. Schwab
_______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 17, 2015
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES, and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Filed: June 25, 2015)
____________
OPINION*
____________
______________
*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Russell Franklin was part of a three-man drug operation. William Powell was the
leader, Franklin served as a “runner” who conducted hand-to-hand transactions, and
Darin Burke acted as the “enforcer.” Between February and April 2011, undercover
agents and informants made three controlled purchases of heroin from Franklin.
Following these buys, Franklin, Powell, and Burke were each charged with one count of
conspiracy to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. All three eventually
pleaded guilty before the same judge. Franklin, who had two prior state-court drug
convictions, was designated a career offender. As a result, his Guidelines range was 151
to 188 months’ imprisonment. The District Court granted a downward variance and
imposed a sentence of 120 months in prison and three years of supervised release.
Franklin argues on appeal that his sentence was procedurally and substantively
unreasonable. For the following reasons, we affirm.1
First, Franklin contends that the District Court’s determination of drug quantity
was clearly erroneous. At his pre-sentencing hearing, a government agent testified that the

1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For several issues on appeal, Franklin objected prior to, but not
following, the District Court’s imposition of his sentence. The parties dispute whether our
review of those issues is for plain error or abuse of discretion in light of our decision in
United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). We need not
resolve this disagreement because, either way, Franklin’s arguments are without merit.
We will therefore review those procedural and substantive challenges for abuse of
discretion, because he was not aware of his need to re-assert his objections postsentencing in order to avoid plain error review. See United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558,
567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). Where Franklin failed to object entirely at the sentencing
hearing, we review for plain error. United States v. Nappi, 243 F.3d 758, 761 (3d Cir.
2

conspiracy was responsible for 400 to 700 grams of heroin. On cross-examination,
however, the agent acknowledged that only 12 grams of heroin were purchased during the
three-month window outlined in Franklin’s indictment (February through April 2011)—
much of the remaining drug weight was based on conduct that occurred prior to that
timeframe. Notwithstanding this discrepancy, the District Court determined that Franklin
was responsible for 400 to 700 grams. Franklin argues the District Court erred by faulting
him for conduct that predated his entry into the conspiracy as detailed by the indictment.
The problem for Franklin, however, is that the drug quantity determination had no
effect on his sentence because the District Court found, and Franklin concedes, he was
subject to the career offender enhancement. The Guidelines dictate that when the offense
level for a career offender is greater than the offense level otherwise applicable, the
career offender level shall apply.2 Without the enhancement, Franklin’s base offense level
for 400 to 700 grams of heroin is 28.3 As a career offender, that level jumps to 32, which
is the same regardless of drug quantity because it is determined by the statutory maximum
sentence for the offense.4 Accordingly, even if we agreed with Franklin that the District
Court’s calculation of drug quantity was wrong, any error was harmless because, once he
was found to be a career offender, the Guidelines required application of the higher
offense level.5 Franklin admitted this point at his pre-sentencing hearing.6

2001).
2
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(b).
3
Id. § 2D1.1(c).
4
Id. § 4B1.1(b).
5
See, e.g., United States v. Wiggins, 747 F.3d 959, 963-64 (8th Cir. 2014).
3

Second, Franklin argues that, although he was “technically” a career offender, the
District Court should not have sentenced him as one.7 In his sentencing memorandum, he
argued that the Guidelines did not intend to ensnare “retail level drug dealer[s]” such as
himself within the reach of the career offender enhancement.8 Franklin explained that he
was just 26 years old; he spent a total of only six months in prison for his two predicate
drug convictions; he had no violent criminal history; and he had a troubled upbringing.
The District Court rejected this argument. On appeal, Franklin says the career offender
label created unwarranted sentencing disparities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
We find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion. Franklin’s concession
that the District Court was authorized to sentence him as a career offender cuts strongly
against his position. Moreover, the record reflects that the District Court meaningfully
considered Franklin’s arguments in its sentencing decision. Indeed, although it chose to
designate him a career offender, the District Court appears to have found Franklin’s
arguments about the severity of the enhancement somewhat persuasive, for it imposed a
sentence below the bottom of his Guidelines range. Franklin also has not demonstrated
any unwarranted sentencing disparities “among defendants with similar records who have

“[Government:] I don’t believe that any of the objections affect the calculation of the
offense level under the sentencing guidelines, as essentially the offense level for the
offense is less than the career offender status. . . . [Court]: Do you agree with that
correction? [Franklin’s counsel]: Only if they’re going to sentence him as a career
offender.” App. 84.
7
App. 86.
8
App. 61.
6
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been found guilty of similar conduct.”9 As to his co-conspirators in particular, the
disparities in sentence length were reasonable. Powell, the leader of the conspiracy, who
was also a career offender, was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment—31 more
months than Franklin received.10 Burke was sentenced to 70 months, but, as Franklin
acknowledges, he was not a career offender.
Third, Franklin argues the District Court improperly considered a chart at
sentencing that it had not previously disclosed to the parties. In explaining the reasons for
its sentence, the District Court said, “I’ve also considered the chart that I maintain relating
to two drug gang conspiracies, [for] which I’ve done approximately 35-plus
sentencings.”11 It went on to state that Franklin’s 120-month sentence was consistent with
the sentences imposed in those other cases. By not disclosing this chart, Franklin argues,
the District Court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(B), which
requires courts to afford parties a “reasonable opportunity to comment” on information
relied upon in sentencing. In support, Franklin cites our decision in United States v.
Nappi, where we held that the trial court violated Rule 32 because it did not disclose a
state-court presentence report that it discussed at sentencing.12
We will assume the District Court violated Rule 32 because, even so, Franklin

9

United States v. Parker, 462 F.3d 273, 277 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(6)) (emphasis removed).
10
Powell’s sentence was later reduced to 84 months under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 35(b).
11
App. 141.
12
243 F.3d at 768.
5

cannot prevail for the same reason the defendant in Nappi was ultimately unsuccessful.13
As in that case, Franklin never objected to the District Court’s use of the chart. His claim
is thus subject to plain-error review, which means he must demonstrate prejudice.14 The
defendant in Nappi did not show prejudice because he was unable to explain either what
he would have done differently had he known about the report or how the report actually
impacted his sentence.15 Similarly, Franklin has not offered any reason to suggest his
sentence would have been different if he had the opportunity to review the chart prior to
sentencing. In the alternative, Franklin urges us to presume prejudice when faced with
these types of failure-to-disclose violations. However, we rejected that exact argument in
Nappi.16
Finally, Franklin briefly suggests that his sentence was substantively unreasonable,
relying on the same assertions we have already addressed in connection with his argument
that the sentence was procedurally defective. Having found his sentence procedurally
sound, however, we reject his substantive challenge because we cannot say that “no
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence” on Franklin.17
For all these reasons, we affirm the District Court’s judgment.

13

We note, however, that at least one court has found no Rule 32 violation when
confronted with a sentencing court’s failure to disclose a spreadsheet of past sentences.
See United States v. Sanchez-Martinez, 537 F. App’x 693, 695 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The
court simply relied on a formalized version of what all district judges rely upon: their
experience of imposing sentences in past, relevant cases.”).
14
See Nappi, 243 F.3d at 760.
15
Id. at 770-771.
16
Id. at 770.
17
Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.
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